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Picket Line Observance:
The Board and the Balance of Interests
When an employee refuses to cross a picket line at the business of an
employer other than his own, divergent interests are brought into con-
flict. Union morality commands that workers not cross any picket
lines;' an employee's observance of a picket line not only aids the cause
of the picketing employees but also strengthens the solidarity of the
labor movement as a whole. From the perspective of an employer,
however, the observance by his men of a picket line at another em-
ployer's establishment often entails substantial costs. The refusal of
employees to pick up essential materials from a picketed supplier can
close a business; the failure to service a picketed customer may mean
the permanent loss of patronage.2
Should an employee refuse to cross a picket line at the premises of
either his own employer or another employer and thereby not complete
his assigned duties, the only statutory restrictions on his employer's
freedom to discipline or discharge him are the unfair labor practices
contained in Section 8(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act.3
Those provisions protect against employer interference the rights
granted to employees by Section 7 of that Act:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities... .4
It has been established that an employee who refuses to cross a lawful
picket line at his own employer's premises and remains totally out of
work is to be treated as a striker, even if he is not a member of the
1. J. BARBAsH, LABOR UNIONS IN AcTION 129 (1948).
2. In the case of a common carrier, the refusal of his employees to service a picketed
depot may make him liable for damages for breaching his statutory duty "to provide and
furnish . . . transportation upon reasonable request therefor.- See, e.g., Minneapolis &-
St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1954).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this
ile;... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of emplo) ment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization...
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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picketing union or part of the bargaining unit involved. ' Still not
satisfactorily reconciled are the conflicting rights of labor and manage-
ment when an employee refuses during the course of his duties to cross
a labor picket line set up at the premises of an employer other than
his own. While such a refusal is clearly not illegal," the extent to which
Section 7 limits the employer's right to react remains unclear 1
At present, the National Labor Relations Board attempts to define
the rights of employee and employer in this situation by balancing the
competing interests. However, an analysis of the Board's proper role
in the collective bargaining process leads to the conclusion that the
Board should not undertake the function of reconciling the divergent
interests but should instead leave it to the parties to work out their
own accommodation in this area.
I. The Case Law
In dealing with employer-employee conflict over the observance of
picket lines at other employers' premises, the National Labor Relations
Board has acted with an inconsistency that has bred confusion. The
5. NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, - F.2d -, 74 LRRM 2080 (5th Cir. 1970);
NLRB v. City Yellow Cab Co., 344 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 277
F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1960). An economic striker cannot be discharged, but he may be
permanently replaced. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 3833 (1938).
6. Section 8(b)(4) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), includes the proviso:
[N]othing contained in this subsection (b) [the union unfair labor practice provi.
sions] shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon
the premises of any employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of
such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of
such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act.
7. The legislative history of the 1947 Act includes but one brief explanation of the
Section 8(b)(4) proviso, note 6 supra, and no indication that Congress even considered
the question of whether an employer should be free to discipline employees for refusing
to cross picket lines at the premises of other employers or whether he was prohibited
from so doing by Section 7s protection of "concerted activities for the purpose of ...
mutual aid or protection." 1 LIsESLATivE HIsToRY OF TUE LMOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONs
Acr, 1947, at 429 (S.Rep. No. 105 on S.1126). Amendments relating to the problem were
proposed in 1959, but no consensus of what the law was or what it should be was evident
and the 8(b)(4) proviso remained unchanged. 1 LErISLATIvE HISTORY O 'rTHE LAiOiR
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIsCLosuRE AcT OF 1959, at 755-56, 779-80, 838; 2 id. at
1312-13, 1315-17, 1389, 1425, 1432, passim.
A literal reading of Section 8(a)(1), prohibiting all employer interference with "em-
ployees in the exercise of the right guaranteed by Section 7." would prevent employers
from opposing in any fashion any concerted activity by their employees. This inter.
pretation of the Act has never been accepted:
where are many economic weapons which an employer may use that either inter.
fere in some measure with concerted employee activities, or which arc in some
degree discriminatory and discourage union membership, and yet the use of such
economic weapons does not constitute conduct that is within the prohibition of
either § 8(a)(1) or § 8(a)(3).
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965). Instead, the term "concerted activity" has been
applied as a legal rather than a literal concept, with the Board determining what ac.
tivities are protected and to what extent. See generally Cox, The Right to Engage in
Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
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first encounter with the problem came in 1950 when the Board declared
unlawful a stockbroker's discharge of one of its employees for his re-
fusal to cross a picket line established at the New York Stock Ex-
change.8 The Board declared the observance of the picket line to be
"protected concerted activity" within the meaning of Section 7 and
ordered reinstatement and back pay for the discharged employee.
The next year, in Rockaway News Supply Co.," the Board explained
that, although an employee's refusal to cross a lawful picket line at the
plant of an employer other than his own was a "protected form of con-
certed activity," the employer, "as a normal incident of its right to
maintain its operations," could require the employee to perform all
his duties or to vacate his job and assume the position of a striker,
thereby becoming subject to permanent replacement. Outright dis-
charge of the employee, however, remained a violation of the Act.
On the Board's petition for enforcement in Rockaway News, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the Board's conclu-
sion that the activity was "protected" and held that the employee's
right to refuse to cross a picket line at another employer's establishment
existed only when he was on his own time.' 0 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case, but then specifically refused to pass on
the "protected concerted activity" issue." While affirming the Court of
Appeals' reversal of the Board, the Court did so on the ground that
the no-strike clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement
governing the discharged employee's terms of employment was still
valid. The employer, according to the Supreme Court, did not commit
an unfair labor practice by discharging the employee since the latter's
refusal to cross the picket line was a violation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, as interpreted in an earlier arbitration proceeding
involving the same incident.'2
Later in 1953, after the Eisenhower administration had replaced
some of the Board members with its own appointees, the NLRB ig-
nored its former rulings on an employee's refusal to cross a picket line
at the premises of an employer other than his own, and in its Auto
Parts Co. decision 3 simply stated that
8. Cyril de Cordova & Bro., 91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950).
9. 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951).
10. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d III (2d Cir. 1952).
11. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953):
The parties here see the case as requiring decision of sweeping abstract principles
as to the respective rights of employer and employee regarding picket lines. But this
decision does not, and should not be read to, declare any such principles.
12. 345 U.S. at 81.
13. 107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953).
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[the employee's] conduct was a refusal to do the job for which
he had been hired and a direct disregard of his employer's instruc-
tions. For such conduct he could properly be discharged.' 4
In the early months of 1961, with Eisenhower appointees still com-
prising a majority, the Board in Redwing Carriers, Inc.15 affirmed its
Auto Parts position; this time it specifically declared that an employee's
refusal to cross a picket line at another employer's premises was "un-
protected" activity, and hence grounds for discharge."0
Kennedy appointees gained control of the NLRB in the spring of
1961 and were apparently determined to waste no time in altering labor
policy.'7 The 1961 Redwing case, on appeal to the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, was remanded at the request of the Board for
further consideration. In its second Redwing decision,18 the Board
again held that the employer did not commit an unfair labor practice
by discharging employees who refused to cross the picket line. In reach-
ing this decision, however, the Board now announced that an em-
ployee's refusal to cross a picket line at another employer's premises
was "protected".
Such activity is literally for "mutual aid or protection," as well
as to assist a labor organization, within the meaning of Section 7.,
Redwing Carriers had not violated the Act because its discharges
were covered by the one exception to the new protected activity rule:
[T]he employer acted only to preserve efficient operation of his
business, and terminated the services of the employees only so it
could immediately or within a short period thereafter replace them
with others willing to perform the scheduled work .... 20
14. Id. at 243. The Board considered it immaterial that the duties not performedby the employee related to the union activities of employees elsewhere. It refused even
to discuss or to adopt the Trial Examiner's comments on previous Board and Court
decisions.
15. 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961).
16. The Board's decision included no explanation of why such activity was unpro-
tected, but in a footnote it cited cases for "the principle that employees cannot insist
on remaining at work on their own terms and conditions, or that partial or Inter-
mittent work stoppages are unprotected .. " 130 N.L.R.B. at 1212 n.9.
17. See generally Grodin, The Kennedy Labor Board, in LABOR: READiNcs ON MAJOR
Issurs 506 (Lester ed.1965).
18. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enforced sub nom. Teamsters
Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1961).
19. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1546-47. The Board first pointed out that the 1953 Auto Parts
decision never specifically declared the activity unprotected and then cited the 1950 Cyril
de Cordova & Bro. decision, 91 N.L.R.B. 1121, and Cone Bros. Contracting Co,, 185
N.L.R.B. 108 (1962), a one-month old decision by the new Board not fully on point.




The NLRB has on several occasions applied its Redwing doctrine,21
but the courts have never fully adopted it. On appeal, those Board
decisions in which the doctrine has been determinative have either
been affirmed on other grounds or reversed with at least implicit re-
jection of the Redwing approach.22
The practical problems of interpreting the concepts in the Redwing
exception are extensive. Much of the difficulty stems from the attempt
to equate the rights of an employee refusing to cross a picket line at
the premises of an employer other than his own with the rights of an
employee striking against his own employer.2 Thus, under Redwing,
the picket line observer, like the economic striker2 4 is subject to re-
placement but not outright discharge. In the context of an economic
strike, replacement is a relatively identifiable act-someone has taken
over the striking employee's entire job. In the case of the picket line
observer, however, the employee most often refuses to perform not all
his duties, but only those which must be performed at picketed prem-
ises.
Where the employer assigns another employee or a supervisor to do
21. See, e.g., Smith Transit, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (1969); Alamo Express, Inc.,
170 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (1968); Swaine & Morris Construction Co., 168 N.L.RB. No. 147
(1967); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1967); Overnite Transportation
Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 72 (1967); Overnite Transportation Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1965),
enforced in part sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 728 v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir.
1966); L.G. Everist, Inc., 142 N.L.R B. 193, enforcement denied, 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir.
1964).
22. In the appeal of the Redwing decision itself, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals avoided the merits of the doctrine, instead noting that under both the Auto
Parts no-protection rule and the Redwing doctrine's replacement-for-business.necessity
exception, Redwing Carriers did not commit an unfair labor practice by discharging the
picket line-observing employees. In Truck Drivers Local 728 v. NLRB, 364 F.2d
682 (1966), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals again avoided pasing on the
Redwing doctrine, this time by affirming a Section 8(a)(3) violation found by the Board;
since the remedy of reinstatement was the same for both violations, there was no need
for the court to consider the Section 8(a)(l) violation found by the Board's application
of the Redwing doctrine. In Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (1964), the
same court did refer to its own Redwing decision as affirming the Board's holding of
protection for the refusal to cross the picket line, but the case involved the validity of
a contract clause and the decision did not discuss the exception in Redwing or the merits
of the doctrine itself.
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in NLRB v. Everist Co., 334 F.2d
312 (1964), in effect rejected the whole doctrine, although die court's decision did not
specifically challenge the Board's declaration of the activity as "protected."
23. This analogy is not even the most appropriate. The picket line observer, who
refuses to perform only part of his work-the part that must be done at the picketed
premises-can more closely be equated with a partial striker who receives no protection
for similarly refusing to perform only part of his work. But this analogy too is not
compelling since the partial striker, like the full striker, is conducting a primary action
against his own employer, the employer can end the strike by yielding to the demands
of his employees. The employer confronted with an employee observing a picket line at
the premises of another employer is only a secondary employer and has no means to
terminate the picket line; the action is being directed against the picketed employer and
only that employer can act to end it.
24. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U . 333 (1938).
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the picketed work, it is unclear whether the picket line-observing
employee has been "replaced." In Thurston Motor Line, Inc.,26 for
instance, the Board held the discharge of a driver lawful when, because
of the presence of a picket line at one of his regular stops, a supervisor
had to make a single delivery for him. In Overnite Transportation
Co., 26 on the other hand, the Board held a discharge unlawful where
the employee, one of several drivers who responded to radio instruc.
tions without having a permanent route, refused to cross a picket line
at a plant where he was told to stop, thus forcing another driver to
make the trip. The Board's explanation-that such discharges are law-
ful "only when the employer's business need to replace the employees
is such as clearly to outweigh the employees' right to engage in pro.
tected activity" 27-does not distinguish two similar cases that have
different results. It adverts to a conflict of interests but does not give
clear guidance about the proper weight to be given to those interests.
Where the employer leaves the picketed work temporarily undone,
it is similarly uncertain in any particular instance whether he may dis-
charge the employee. In order to satisfy the Redwing exception, not
only must the employer be able to secure a replacement "immediately
or within a short period of time," 28 but he must also be able to prove
that the discharge was necessary "to preserve the efficient operation" of
his business.2 9 Precise standards do not exist for judging when an act
is sufficiently important for maintaining efficiency to justify a discharge.
Thus, under Redwing, whether an employer arranges for another of
his employees to do the picketed work and then discharges the picket
line observer or whether he immediately discharges the employee in
order to hire a replacement, ambiguous concepts are retroactively ap.
plied by the Board to determine the lawfulness of the discharge. The
parties30 are not only denied the opportunity to assess accurately the
25. 166 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1967).
26. 154 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1965).
27. Id. at 1274.
28. In L.G. Everist, Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 193 (1964), the Board held unlawful the re-
fusal of the employer to reinstate four employees discharged for refusing to cross a
picket line since the four had requested reinstatement before they were replaced. The
Court of Appeals, in reversing the Board, stressed that once an employee is discharged
an employer may enforce his rule against rehiring discharged employees. 334 F.2d 312
(8th Cir. 1964).
29. The urgency required of the employer by the customer to complete the unper-
formed, picketed work is relevant in determining the necessity of preserving the efficient
operation of the business. Swaine & Morris Construction Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 147
(1967).
30. Ambiguity encompasses not only the employer's position but that of the em.
ployees as well. When confronted with a picket line which he would like to respect, an




legal consequences of their actions,31 but the entire affair is left open
to extensive manipulation by the well-counseled employer. A discharge
letter worded in terms of business necessity, correspondence indicating
the urgency of the job, and apparent replacement of the discharged
employee, all go a long way toward proving a discharge to be within
the Redwing exception.
II. The Proper Role of the NLRB
A. The Limits of Balancing
In resolving the problem of an employer's rights when one or more of
his employees refuse to cross a picket line at another employer's prem-
ises, the Board claims it is striking the "proper balance" 32 betveen the
rights of employees to engage in concerted activity under Section 7 and
the rights of an employer to run his business efficiently.
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the balancing of inter-
ests as a proper function for the Board:
Clearly, where "the ultimate problem is the balance of the con-
flicting legitimate interests" it must be remembered that "The
function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy
is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress
committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, sub-
ject to limited judicial review." 33
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to ad-
monish the Board for attempting to balance the economic power of
union and employer:
[T]he Act does not constitute the Board as an "arbiter of the sort
which the Board itself often has difficulty, can be impossible for the employee. Yet,
should he refuse to cross a line which is later declared unlawful, he has no protection,
Drivers' Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1966); should he cross a law-
ful picket line, he is subject to a fine by his union for 'conduct unbecoming a union
member." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
31. Indicative of this uncertainty is that on at least two occasions, Swaine F: Morris
Construction Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 147 (1967), and Overnite Transportation Co., 154
N.L.R.B. 1271 (1965), the Board generally accepted the facts as found by the Trial
E-xaminers, applied the Redwing doctrine to the facts, and yet arrived at conclusions
opposite to those of the Trial Examiners.
A business which retains a labor attorney will normally seek advice before discharging
an employee for an union-related activity; similarly, union counsel will often inform
local leaders of the rights of their members to act in particular circumstances. It is for
this reason that the ambiguity of the Redwing doctrine, which does not allow the parties
to foresee the legal consequences of their actions, creates practical difficulties for both
union and management.
32. Swaine & Morris Construction Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 67 L.D.R.M. 1039, IG10(1967).
33. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 US. 477, 499 (1960).
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of economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain accep-
tance of their bargaining demands."34
These two positions of the Supreme Court present an apparent in-
consistency: the role of balancing "the conflicting legitimate inter-
ests," approved by the Court, is effectuated by the Board's serving as
an "arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use," the
role explicitly disapproved by the Court. Prohibiting an employer
from discharging an employee for certain action which the Board has
labeled "protected" is a restriction on the employer's economic power,
as exercised through his control over employment; yet making a
determination that certain activities are protected is a recognized
function of the Board.35
The explanation of the apparent inconsistency lies not in a recondite
analysis of the supposed distinction between "weapons" and "interests"
but in the realization that the function of Board intervention differs
depending on the stage of the union-employer relationship in which
it occurs. The central policy of the Labor-Management Relations Act
-the promotion of collective bargaining as the favored means to in-
dustrial peace 3 ---justifies certain Board interventions involving the ad-
justment of interests and weapons, but excludes interventions at other
stages of the collective bargaining process, which nonetheless involve
similar adjustments.
The encouragement of collective bargaining is provided, in part, by
the guarantee to employees of "the right to self-organization, to form,
34. NLRB v. Brown, 380 US. 278, 283 (1965).
35. See note 7 supra.
36. Section I of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the Causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining ....
The Supreme Court, in H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970), recently eX-
plained:
The object of this Act was not to allow governmental regulation of the terms and
conditions of employment, but rather to ensure that employers and their employees
could work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. The basic theme of
the Act was that through collective bargaining the passions, arguments and struggleg of
prior years would be channeled into constructive, open discussions leading, It was
hoped, to mutual agreement.
The provision in Section 7 protecting the right of employees "to refrain from any
or all of such activities," added to the Act in 1947, does not cut back at all on the
Act's encouragement of collective bargaining. The freedom of employees to select a
bargaining representative of their own choosing or to select no bargaining representa-
tive at all, thereby permitting the employer to set the terms and conditions of
employment unilaterally, is a necessary component of free collective bargainiig. The
government's protection of this freedom of choice, especially when compared wth the
situation that existed prior to the Act's passage in 1935, is itself indicative of the legis-




join, or assist labor organizations." 37 It is during union organization
that the Board, with court approval and assistance, has most often and
most appropriately adjusted the conflicting interests of the employer
with those of his employees. The organizational rights of employees
have been balanced against the rights of employers to maintain dis-
cipline in their establishments, 38 to prevent disruption of business,:t9 to
preserve safety,40 and to control the use of their property.41 From de-
cisions such as these, various rules governing union opportunities to
solicit new members and employer response to such solicitation have
emerged.42 The Board, by balancing conflicting interests, is functioning
to create "a climate within which employees can freely determine
whether they wish to collectivize their employment relationship .... "4
Such balancing encourages union organization and, thus, is clearly con-
sistent with the Act's policy of collective bargaining as the favored
means of avoiding industrial conflict.
While the balancing done by the Board in setting up the rules which
govern union organizing campaigns advances the purposes of the legis-
lation, once a bargaining relationship has been established the need for
the Board to accommodate conflicting interest no longer exists.
Having protected employee organization in countervailance to
the employer's bargaining power, and having established a system
of collective bargaining whereby the newly coequal adversaries
might resolve their disputes, the Act also contemplated resort to
economic weapons should more peaceful measures not avail. Sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and (3) do not give the Board a general authority
to assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the
bargaining process and to deny weapons to one party or the other
because of its assessment of the party's bargaining power.44
As Supreme Court decisions of the last decade have indicated, the
NLRB should not use its powers to restrict either the employer's
or the union's use of economic force. In both the American Shipbuild-
ing' 5 and Brown46 cases the Court rejected the balancing by the Board
37. Section 7 of the Act, p. 1369 supra.
38. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
39. Marshall Field & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952).
40. Great Atlantic 9: Padfic Tea Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 747 (1959), enforced. 277 F-fd 759
(5th Cir. 1960).
41. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956.
42. See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Ele-
tions Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 -HRv. L. REv. 38 (1964).
43. H. WVELLNGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL Paocrss 45 (1968).
44. American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965).
45. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
46. NLRB v. Brown, 380 US. 278 (1965).
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and expanded the right of employers to lock out employees during
negotiations. In the Insurance Agents case,47 the Supreme Court over-
ruled the Board's holding that certain employee on-the-job activity
designed to exert economic pressure on the employer during the
negotiating period was unlawful.48 Although the activity was not pro-
tected,49 and therefore subject to employer response, neither was it
unlawful; both sides were free to flex their economic muscle.
Congress has mandated some Board intervention in the negotiation
process by its imposition on both labor 0 and managementu' of the
duty to bargain in good faith. While the vagueness contained in the
statutory definition of good faith bargaining 2 requires the Board to
determine state of mind by examining the conduct of the parties, the
Supreme Court has insisted that the good faith requirement does no
more than authorize the Board to assure that the bargaining envisioned
in the Act between the employer and the designated collective bargain-
ing agent of his employees does in fact occur.53
It is implicit in the entire structure of the Act that the Board
acts to oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining,
leaving the results of the contest to the bargaining strengths of the
parties.54
The duty to bargain in good faith, while requiring limited Board
intervention in the negotiation process, is meant to guarantee meaning
to the selection by employees of a bargaining representative and is thus
consistent with the position that balancing by the Board is appropriate
only to protect the organizational interests of employees. 8
47. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
48. The Board had declared the on-the-job activity a violation of the Sectlon 8(b)(8)
duty to bargain in good faith. 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957).
49. Local 232 UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 2,45 (1919).
50. Section 8(b)(3) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § I 8(b)(5)
(1964).
51. Section 8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964),
52. Section 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.c. § 158(d):
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment....
53. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
54. 397 U.S. at 107-08.
55. Certain lower federal courts have assigned an independent rather than a suppor-
tive role to the good faith requirement and have, for example, determined that partic.
ular bargaining techniques are less likely to lead to agreement than others and hence are
prohibited as not in good faith. Such balancing as is then required serves the undesirable
fnction of attempting to equalize the power of the parties. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLI,
414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969), reversed, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); NLRB v. Reed F: Prince
Manufacturing Co., 205 F.2d 131 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953). See generally




While some governmental structuring of labor-management interests
is in fact present during negotiations,50 any adjustment of conflicting
interests by the NLRB and the courts once a collective bargaining
agreement has been signed directly contradicts the policy of free col-
lective bargaining as the desired means of industrial dispute settle-
ment.5 Collective bargaining is itself the method by which the parties
themselves adjust their rights and conflicting interests to serve their
own needs.
The Wagner Act became law on the floodtide of the belief that
the conflicting interests of management and worker can be adjusted
only by private negotiation, backed, if necessary, by economic
weapons, without the intervention of law. s
Thus, collective bargaining agreements commonly include no-strike
clauses, bargained and presumably paid for by the employer, which
deprive the employees of statutory rights. Similarly, restrictions on the
employer's free operation of his business are a major part of every col-
lective bargaining agreement, these restrictions being bargained and
paid for by the union. With the exception of those rights relating to
union organization,59 all Section 7 rights are subject to negotiation and
56. Besides the good faith bargaining requirement, Congress itself has balanced
some economic weapons, for example, by prohibiting in Section 8(b)(4) of the Act various
forms of secondary boycotts. 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4). This balancing by Congress perhaps
provides additional support for the proposition that the Board should refrain from so
doing.
Yet the Board has continued to balance the conflicting weapons of employer and em-
ployees during negotiations, the classic example being the strike, an aberration -which
can only be explained by the special status granted strikes in the Act itself (m Section 13
as well as Section 7) and in American labor lore.
57. The one exception to this rule is the Board's protection of organizing interests,
which are not subject to negotiation by the parties. See note 59 infra. This area of per.
missible Board intervention is consistent with the general proposition that Board
balancing is appropriate in the organizational process. See p. 1377 supra. See aho note
72 infra, concerning Section 8(a)(3) violations, and p. 1378 supra, which includes a dis-
cussion of the good faith bargaining requirement.
Court approval of Board orders directing employers, despite explicit waiver by the
unions in the contracts themselves, to bargain on matters not specifically covered in their
operative collective agreements in effect nullify express lawful provisions negoiated
by the parties. See, e.g., NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 US. 421 (1957). The Act
does not justify such judicial and administrative interference. See also NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967), and Unit Drop Forge Division, Eaton, Yale & Toune,
Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1969).
58. Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 314, 322 (1951).
59. The freedom of employees to choose a particular union as their bargaining repre-
sentative, to select a rival union to replace the certified representative, or to elect not to
be represented or no longer to be represented by any union is an inherent part of the
Acts policy of free collective bargaining. Since rival unions and anti-union employees are
not represented at the bargaining table, a certified union's bargaining army of opposition
rights defeats this part of the Act's policy, and therefore should be unlawful. But the
Courts of Appeals are not even in agreement on this point. Compare NLRB v. Gale
Products Division of Outboard Marine Corp., 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964), where the
court held valid the impartial enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement provision
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adjustment by the parties themselves.00 Board intervention, in the form
of balancing interests, functions, during the life of a contract, not to
promote collective bargaining but to replace it. In effect, it inserts a
substantive term or condition into the employment relationship. In-
tervention having this function cannot be justified by the goals of the
Act.
B. Picket Line Observance
In light of the discussion of the Board's role in balancing interests in
the collective bargaining process, an examination of the stages of the
union-employer relationship in which the picket line observance prob-
lem occurs suggests that at no time would Board intervention function
to promote collective bargaining.
The picket line observance problem arises most often where a col.
lective bargaining agreement is in existence. It is the union member,
usually working under a negotiated contract, who is most likely to
observe the picket line at the premises of another employer.01 In such
a situation, where the picket line-observing employee's terms and
conditions of employment have been negotiated by his certified repre-
sentative and his employer, intervention by the National Labor
Relations Board is most objectionable.
The Board's adjustment of the conflicting interests, presently ex-
pressed in the Redwing doctrine, prevails only when the parties them-
selves have failed to negotiate their own accommodation. Yet, the Act
requires labor and management to negotiate all "conditions of employ-
ment. '62 In applying the Redwing resolution to a particular case, the
prohibiting the distribution of union literature or solicitation of union membership on
company premises, with NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir,
1968), in which the court enforced a Board decision finding the employer's enforcement of
a collective bargaining agreement provision which prohibited soliciting or collecting con.
tributions and distributing literature on com pany premises an unfair labor practice.
60. Even where the Board or the Court has balanced economic weapons, the parties
may establish their own adjustment of the interests, a resolution which prevails over one
administratively or judicially created. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270(1956), for example, the Supreme Court, after holding that a strike in protest of an
employer's unfair labor practice does not violate a general no-strike clause in the collective
bargaining agreement, indicated, "We assume that the employees, by explicit contractual
provision, could have waived their right to strike against such unfair labor practices...."
550 U.S. at 279.
61. This is especially true if the picketing is being conducted by another local of hh
own union or by a union which has received the formal support of the employee's union,
The Teamsters Union, for instance, often recognizes certain picket lines and refuses to
respect others, its decisions being motivated primarily by inter-union politics.
62. As part of their duty to bargain in good faith, the parties are required to negotiate
any issue raised by either side if it is a "term or condition of employment," 29 U.S.C.§ 158(d). See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRD v.




Board, by its adjustment of the conflicting interests, is writing a clause
of the collective bargaining agreement for the parties. Such interference
by the Board is in direct opposition to the policy of free collective bar-
gaining. 3 The proper resolution of the problem, where the agreement
does not specifically cover picket line observance, is the procedure
the parties themselves have provided in their contract for handling dis-
puted discharges."
The problem of an employer's rights when an employee refuses to
cross a picket line can also arise during contract negotiations, but the
policy of Board abstention should still prevail. During negotiations,
when employees are particularly sensitive to union allegiance, observ-
ance of other workers' picket lines may be intended both to symbolize
worker unity and to pressure their own employer into yielding to their
demands. If the old contract has not yet expired, the terms of that
agreement, of course, govern the problem. Once those provisions ex-
pire, the observance of picket lines at the premises of other employers,
like other forms of economic pressure applied during negotiations, can
be freely exercised and freely responded to.5 With the parties sitting
at the bargaining table at the time anyway, any discharges related to
the picket line observance problem, as well as the problem itself, can
be immediately negotiated, a collectively bargained solution being
the most desirable resolution.
When the employee of an unorganized employer refuses to cross a
picket line at another employer's premises, letting the Board determine
the legal rights of the parties by balancing their conflicting interests
would again not encourage collective bargaining, but might, in fact,
discourage it. Employees who have chosen a bargaining representative
may very well have no protection in their collective bargaining agree-
ment against employer discipline of employees who observe picket
lines; those employees who have elected not to organize would, on the
other hand, retain the benefits of the Board's intervention. The un-
organized employer, rather than unilaterally setting terms and condi-
tions of employment, would have his decisions reviewed by the NLRB.
63. In H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 US. 99, 102 (1970), the Supreme Court reiter-
ated:
[W]hile the Board does have power under the Labor Management Relations
Act, 61 STAT. 136, as amended, to require employers and employees to negotiate, it is
without power to compel a company or a union to agree to any substantive con-
tractual provision of a collective bargaining agreement.
64. The discharge of an employee for his refusal to cross a picket line at the premises
of another employer, under most contracts, should proceed as a union challenge to a dis.
charge it daims to be without cause.
65. See pp. 1377-78 supra.
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Thus, in those situations in which the Board's balance gives employees
a greater measure of support than a particular union could produce at
the bargaining table, the employees are better off without a union.
Board intervention that has such an effect has no place in the Act's
scheme.
When, as part of their own organizing efforts, the employees of a
non-union employer refuse to cross a picket line at the premises of
another employer, the Board's role should, in theory, be different. Since
one of the interests involved is the employees' right to organize, this is
the one instance where the NLRB should balance all the conflicting
interests present. 6 However, an examination of the alternatives open
to the Board indicates that even in this situation the Board should not
restrict the employer's right to discharge.
A Board balance that results in a compromise of conflicting inter-
ests is effective in other organizing situations where, for example, the
scope of allowable union solicitation can be defined by relatively pre-
cise spatial and temporal limitations. 7 In the picket line observance
context, however, a compromise balance would lead to ambiguity, as
the Redwing doctrine illustrates. 8 The critical characteristic of any
rule applicable during an organizational campaign and involving pos.
66. See p. 1377 supra.
The one other situation involving the right of employees to organize is the observance
of an organizational picket line. Such a situation, however, does not affect the rights of
picket line observers. Since organized employees can bargain away the right to cross any
picket line (see note 75 infra), including an organizational picket line, the arguments
against Board intervention where collective bargaining agreements do not contain spedfic
provisions governing picket line observance (see pp. 1380-81 supra) and where there is no
union (see pp. 1381-82 supra) prevail. In the unlikely case where the pickets and the picket
line observers are both acting to advance their own organizational rights, tile balance (see
pp. 1382-84 infra) would shift only slightly while the ambiguity if any protection were
granted would increase significantly.
67. See, for example, Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 824 U.S. 793 (1945), where
the Court approved the Board's rule that an employer may prohibit union solicitation by
employees on company property during working hours, but not before or after working
hours, and Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 (1962), where the
Board announced, in reference to the distribution of union literature, that "we believe
organizational rights in that regard require only that employees have acccss to non-
working areas of the plant premises."
68. It is difficult to imagine an unambiguous standard for resolving the picket line
observance problem that would effectively compromise the interests of the employer In
the efficient operation of his business and that of his employees In advancing labor unity
and assisting the organizing of their co-workers. The Board, in its Rocakaway News deci.
sion, 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951), declared the observance of a picket line protected, but granted
the employer the right to require the employee to vacate his job and assume the position
of a full striker. This solution, which was rejected by both the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, 197 F.2d 111, 114-15 (1952), and the Supreme Court, 845 U.S. 71, 75 (1953), is the
practical equivalent of a rule prohibiting the observance of picket lines at other em.
ployers' premises, while permitting an employee to strike and thereby assume the liabilitiea
contained in the balance involving the right to strike. Such a solution can hardly be con-
sidered a compromise balance for the problem of picket line observance, since by forcing
the picket line observer to become a full striker, it simply eliminates picket line
observance as an act distinct from a strike.
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sible discharges"" is clarity and consistency in result; vague standards
which do not enable the parties to pre-determine the lawfulness of dis-
charges for particular actions increase the likelihood of the parties
acting to precipitate discharges, and the discharge of a union adherent
is the event most detrimental to the organizational process.70 The need
for a clear rule to guide actions requires that a choice be made between
one of the two easily applied alternatives to a compromise balance-
either total protection or no protection at all.
As an organizing tool, the refusal to cross a picket line at another
employer's premises is of limited value to the union. While the tactic
might enhance the feeling of union solidarity and demonstrate the in-
creased power workers acquire by mutual cooperation, it has rela-
tively little effect on the ability of employees to cast knowledgeable
votes in the representation election. The real strength in the observ-
ance of picket lines at the premises of other employers is the pressure
it places on the employer of the picket line observers to coerce some
of his other employees into selecting the union. Such coercion, which
works to defeat the statutory policy of employee free choice,7' would
be the consequence of granting complete protection.
The no-protection alternative, however, would retain the certainty
necessary in dealing with discharges while still protecting employee free
choice. Moreover, the cost to the union of the no-protection alternative
would not be great; the relatively indirect tactic of picket line observ-
ance would not be protected but the union would be free to risk its
use if it wished. Adoption of such a balance of the interests-granting
no protection against discipline to employees who during the course
of an organizing campaign at their own plant refuse to cross a picket
line at the premises of another employer-would mean that here as
69. Where the possibility of discharge is not involved, the need for dear-cut rules
is less compelling. For example in NLRB v. Babcock S Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
the Court ruled that "an employer may validly post his property against non-employee
distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other available
channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its message....
(emphasis added). 551 U.S. at 112.
70. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. Ray. 38, 125 (1964).
71. Elsewhere the statute specifically treats an analogous problem. Section 8(b)(7) of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7), was intended to curb organizational and recognitional
picketing in order to protect against similar coerdon on the picketed employer to bargain
with a particular union not necessarily desired by a majority of his employees. "Section
8(b)(7) was a logical response to values embodied in the Wagner Act and clarified by the
Taft-Hartley Act. Free choice by individual employees with respect to unionization and
majority rule by the uncoerced members of an appropriate bargaining unit were central
objectives of the Wagner Act." Mfeltzer, Organizatonat Picketing and the NLRB: Fke on
a Seesaw, 30 U. Cm. L R1v. 78, 79 (1962).
1383
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 79:1369, 1970
elsewhere the parties would be left free, without Board interference,
to resolve the problem themselves? 2
III. Conclusion
Board abstention when an employee refuses to cross a picket line at
the premises of an employer other than his own would have several
desirable consequences. Most importantly, employers and unions
would be encouraged to adjust their conflicting interests through
negotiation, rather than relying on the adjustment worked out by the
NLRB.73 A union particularly desirous of the right to respect other
employer's picket lines would be willing to sacrifice other benefits in
return for a clause protecting its members from discipline for refus-
ing to cross such picket lines.74 Those employers particularly con-
cerned with work to be done by their employees outside their own
72. While this Note argues for the elimination of Section 8(a)(1) protection for refusals
by employees to cross picket lines at premises of employers other than their own, the
discharge of an employee for such a refusal could conceivably be an unfair labor practice
under Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, note 3 supra. The discharge of an employee for engaging
in unprotected activity is not unlawful, even when only some of those employees engaging
in the activity are discharged. California Cotton Cooperative Association, 110 N.L,R,B.
1494 (1954). On the other hand, an employer who uses the observance of a picket line as
an excuse to discharge an employee for having engaged in prior protected activity, e.g.,
a discharge resulting from an employer's purposeful transfer of a union organizer to ajob the employer knows will involve crossing a picket line, commits an unfair labor
practice under Section 8(a)(3). For example, in Truck Drivers Local 728 v. NLRB, 864
F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court avoided a decision on whether the refusal to cross a
picket line was "protected" by affirming the Board's finding of an 8(a)(3) violation based
on other employer actions demonstrating his anti-union animus; on that basis the court
affirmed the reinstatement order issued by the Board.
The concept of "protected" activity, as developed in this Note, is necessarily limited to
union organizing efforts and internal union matters not directly affecting the employer.
As such, Board intervention to enforce Section 8(a)(3) violations, although possibly occuring
during negotiations or while a contract is in effect, does not contradict the proposition
that balancing by the Board is appropriate only to protect the organizational interests of
employees. See note 57 supra.
73. In its Rockaway News decision, the Supreme Court, in reference to the Section
8(b)(4) proviso on the right of employees to refuse to cross picket lines, stated
This [the proviso] cearly enables contracting parties to embody in their contract a
provision against requiring an employee to cross a picket line if they so agree, And
nothing in the Act prevents their agreeing upon contrary provisions if they consider
them appropriate to the particular kind of business involved. An employee's breach
of such an agreement may be made grounds for his discharge without violating § 7 of
the Act.
845 U.S. at 80.
Although Section 8(e), added to the Act in 1959, prohibits hot cargo clauses, the Courts
of Appeals have continued to hold valid provisions in collective bargaining ai reementg
which prohibit discipline of employees who refuse to cross lawful primary picket lines,
See, e.g., NLRB v, Bay Counties District Council of Carpenters, 382 F.2d 593 (9th Clr,
1967); Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Truck Drivers Local
413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
74. Thirteen per cent of all collective bargaining agreements specifically prohibit
discipline of individuals who refuse to cross lawful picket lines at the premises of other
employers. 2 BNA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTATIONS AND CONwrRAcrs 77:5 (196I).
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premises would be sure in their negotiations to favor a no-strike
clause, specifying the obligation of employees to cross all picket
lines, 75 even where the consideration for such a clause would be
costly. The encouragement of negotiations between the parties them-
selves would be in complete accord with the purposes of the national
labor legislation:
The object of this Act was not to allow governmental regula-
tion of the terms and conditions of employment, but rather to
ensure that employers and their employees could work together
to establish mutually satisfactory conditions."
For those employers and unions who would not feel the necessity of
bargaining for such contract provisions, freedom from governmental
interference would allow them to choose appropriate responses on
those few occasions when the problem might arise. Employee action
followed by employer reaction would initiate the grievance dispute
settlement procedure agreed to by the parties; arbitration would re-
place NLRB determination.
The advantages of this substitution would be substantial. The ad-
justment by the Board is formulated so as to apply to all employers
covered by the Act. Considerations present in a particular case may
have been absent in the Board's general calculations, thereby making
the balance drawn by the Board inappropriate.77 On the other hand, in
order to compensate for the particular differences in each case, the rule
is necessarily general, resulting in the ambiguities inherent in the Red-
wing doctrine and producing uncertainty of result and possible manip-
ulation of outcome.
In contrast, an arbitrator resolving a conflict can look to the pro-
visions of the particular contract, the general intent of the parties, and
any unique circumstances present in the case.
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties'
confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and
their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations
75. Over 90% of all collective bargaining agreements contain some type of no.strike
clause. 2 BNA, CoLLEcrvE BA GAINING: NEcoT'AiroNs AND CONr.crs 77:1 (19M4). Many
of these provisions would be interpreted to allow the immediate discharge of an em-
ployee for refusing to cross a peaceful picket line. The Supreme Court in its Rochaway
News decision specifically acknowledged and accepted the arbitrator's decision that the
no-strike clause in the parties' contract enabled the employer to discharge the picket
line-observing employee. See p. 1371 supra.
76. H.K. Porter Company v. NLRB, 897 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
77. "[T]he law cannot possibly anticipate the content of an infinite number of atypical
transactions into which members of the community may need to enter." Kessler, Contracts
of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLmu. L. Rxv. 629 (1943).
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which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.
The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance
will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the col-
lective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect
upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the
morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be height-
ened or diminished. For the parties' objective in using the arbi-
tration process is ... to make the agreement serve their special-
ized needs.78
On several occasions in the past arbitrators have dealt with other
picket line observance problems, sometimes interpreting contracts
specifically covering the situation,"0 while at other times relying on
more general clauses80 or setting up their own guidelines.8' There is
no reason to believe Board abstention and increased reliance on arbi-
tration would create any unusual problems,82 especially since a party
dissatisfied with a particular result could negotiate a change in the con-
tract when it expires. The Act states explicitly that
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of griev-
ance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective bargaining agreement.8 3
Finally, the employees will benefit from Board abstention and the
consequent encouragement of negotiation of picket line observance.
78. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 863 U.S. 574,
582 (1960).
79. See, e.g., Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., and Teamsters Locals 542 and 683, 50 L.A. 55
(R. Meiners, 1968); McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Miami Drug Division and Teamsters Local
390, 37 LA. 847 (J.W. McConnell, 1961); Moon Freight Lines, Inc. and Teamsters Local
185, 86 L.A. 852 J.J. Willingham, 1961); F.K. TruckinU Co. and Produce Purveyors Local
202, 34 LA. 252 (B. Turkus, 1959); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. and Teamsters Local 891,
22 L.A. 761 (D. Maggs, 1954).
80. See, e.g., Allied Chain Link Fence Company and United Steelworkers of America,
67-1 CCH LAB. ARB AWARDS 3510 (J. Giles, 1967); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company
and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Local 5-283, 42 L.A. 626 (W. Quinlan, 1946).
81. See, e.g., Gulf Coast Motor Lines, Inc., 49 L.A. 261 (R.R. Williams, 1967), Water-
front Employers Association and Longshoremen Local 1-10, 4 L.R.R.M. 1117 (Wayne L.
Morse, 1939).
82. While a contention by the union that an employee's discharge for refusing to cro33
a picket line at another employer's premises was really motivated by his prior protected
union activity, see note 72 supra, would be passed on by the arbitrator, the union could
still file a Section 8(a)(3) charge with the Board. In International Harvester Co., 188
N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert,
denied, 877 U.S. 1003 (1964), the Board stated, at 925-26:
Mihere is no question that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating unfair
labor practice charges even though they might have been the subject of an arbitrator
proceeding award. . . . However, it is equally well established that the Board has
considerable discretion to respect an arbitration award and decline to exercise Its
authority over alleged unfair labor practices if to do so will serve the fundamental
aims of the Act.
83. Section 203(d) of the Act, 29 US.C. § 178(d) (1964).
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The inclusion of a clause in the collective bargaining agreement
covering an employee's rights on approaching a picket line frees the
individual employee from the conflicting pressures of union loyalty
and retention of employment. His course of conduct is dictated by the
terms agreed to by his union and his employer.
[P]arties generally are wiser about their own affairs than others,
including government acting through its legal institutions, can
hope to be.s4
The National Labor Relations Act is apparently based on this premise;
the National Labor Relations Board's actions in regard to an em-
ployee's observance of a picket line at the premises of an employer
other than his own seem intent on denying it.
81 H. WVErcTaroN, LABOR AD TH Lrcwu PRCoS 29 (198).
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